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1. Introduction
The dominant form of analysis of organisational behaviours and structures, closely drawing from
mainstream economics, takes a rather extreme agency approach, seeking to identify the most efficient
incentive mechanisms for the coordination of decisions.  However, such an incentive-based approach
adopts the highly dubious assumption that both the structures for problem-solving and the necessary
search heuristics (e.g. ‘rules of thumb’ for decision making) exist, unproblematically, from the outset.
Here and throughout the paper, the term ‘problem-solving’ includes all the acts undertaken by
individuals and groups within economic organisations (firms) to resolve organisational and
technological problems and to conceptualise, design, test and build products and processes.
In the case of most firms – new and incumbent ones – facing market and technological uncertainty,
what one could call the "problem-free" assumption is profoundly unrealistic and assumes away the
difficulty of constructing a theory to explain the co-evolution of problem-solving knowledge and
organisational arrangements in firms.  In turn, this demands some basic analytical tools to examine
how firms deploy and match problem-solving activities with governance arrangements.
1  This is
especially important where tasks are inherently complex and non-routine in nature and where many
possible problem-solving and organisational solutions are possible.
The first purpose of this paper is to outline an evolutionary framework for analysing how problem-
solving knowledge in firms co-evolve with organisational forms in complex task environments.
These characteristics apply to most activities performed by new high technology firms and to the
many functions in larger established corporations which are non-routine and non-codifiable by
nature, including strategy formulation, R&D, marketing, distribution channel management, new
product design, process engineering, human resource development and supply chain management.
2
The second and complementary aim is to operationalise the evolutionary view of how firms as
knowledge repositories cope with complex, non-routines tasks by evolving appropriate structures to
deal with them.  The practical application of the approach considers one important class of economic
activity, which represents an extreme case of product and task complexity, namely the production of
complex products and systems (or ‘CoPS’), including high cost, tailored capital goods, systems
constructs and services.
3  Because each new product tends to be different and because production
involves feedback loops from later to early stages (and other unpredictable, ‘emerging’ properties),
highly innovative non-functional organisational structures are required to co-ordinate production,
particularly in the commonly found case of unclear and uncertain user requirements.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the basic principles underlying an
evolutionary approach to problem-solving behaviour (PSB) in firms, contrasting these with the
                                               
1  The terms organisational form, structure and governance arrangements are used interchangeably in this
paper.
2 The paper builds on previous works by Marengo (1999) and Marengo, et al. (1999), which provide a
formal mathematical treatment of the approach presented here.
3 Many CoPS confront extreme task complexity because they embody a wide variety of distinctive skills and
types of knowledge, and involve large numbers of firms or organisational units in their production.  In the
past 20 years or so, CoPS have been transformed by software and information technology (IT), leading to
new levels of risk and uncertainty in design and production.  See Hobday (1998) for definition and
discussion of CoPS as an analytical category, and also Miller et al (1995) for an application to the flight
simulation industry.4
dominant (incentive-centred) formulation of agency in organisations.  Section 3 presents the building
blocks of an evolutionary theory of PSB and firm organisation, representing PSB as a form of
complex design activity.  The model – spelled out in more details in Marengo (1999) and Marengo et
al. (1999) – develops upon a 'Simonian' representation of PSB grounded on the notions of
combination of elementary physical and cognitive acts, and de-composability of firm behaviour and
structure in relation to particular product or process outcomes (Simon, 1981; 1991).
Section 4 applies the conceptual framework to CoPS found in sectors such as aerospace, information
systems, many utilities, engineering construction, military systems, transportation and
telecommunications.  Section 5 compares some properties of different organisational set-ups within
multi-firm CoPS projects and their implications for innovative PSBs.  Section 6 draws upon the
organisational behaviour literature to provide a practical set of heuristics for gathering ‘benchmark’
data for complex non-routine projects: in the language we shall introduce below, such heuristics
entail procedures for re-shaping “problem representations” and “problem decompositions”.  Some
examples of the application of these concepts for the purposes of business improvement in CoPS are
touched upon.
4
2. An Evolutionary approach to problem-solving behaviour in firms
Before presenting the basic building blocks of an evolutionary theory of PSB it is useful to briefly
recall the governing principles behind the dominant agency approach.  As known, agency theory
identifies efficient incentive mechanisms for the co-ordination of decisions (see e.g. Tirole, 1986;
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Laffont and Tirole, 1986), while implicitly assuming that PSB structures
and search heuristics exist from the outset.  Within firms, people are postulated to play extremely
sophisticated games according to rules designed to prevent them from doing much harm to others
(and indirectly to themselves).  Neither the complexity of the task itself, nor the product of the firm or
the production technology have much, or any, bearing on the subject at hand.  The main aim is to
generate admissible incentive-compatible procedures based, when taken at face value, on hyper
rational agents.
5
Relatedly, individuals within organisations are assumed to hold the entire plan of what to do, possibly
akin to a well-functioning computer model.  The issue of firm competence and its relationship with
performance does not arise, except for problems of the misrepresentation of ‘intrinsic’ individual
abilities and adverse selection, or incentive misalignment in eliciting effort from individuals.  Within
the firm, as a first approximation, the social division of tasks is irrelevant to practice and
performance.  In the extreme, according to the mainstream approach, given the ‘right’ incentives, any
firm can make any product as well as any other firm (e.g.microprocessors as well as Intel or
bioengineering products as well as Genetech).
6
                                               
4 For more details see Hobday and Brady (2000).
5 Curiously, in the field of software engineering a vaguely similar approach (actually called "rational")
dominates and is defended as a practical way of producing complex software systems (Parnas and Clements,
1986).  See Hobday and Brady (1998) for a critique.
6 Although, as presented here, this "rational" incentive-based view is a caricature, it does help convey the
nature of the major difference between the latter view of economic behaviour in organisations and the
problem-solving evolutionary perspective suggested in the following.5
By contrast, at its most general level, the evolutionary approach sees economic organisations as
problem-solving arrangements, viewing the different observed institutional set ups in the real world
as reflecting the complexity of the tasks and objectives faced by the firm (March and Simon, 1958;
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Marengo, 1994).  In the world of non trivial, complex and
uncertain tasks, governance arrangements and search heuristics play a central part in determining
which eventual solutions are considered as possibilities, tested and ultimately selected.  Relatedly, a
key evolutionary proposition is that in making decisions, firms and individuals and groups within
them, confront extremely large, computationally intractable search ‘spaces’ to chose from.  Therefore
the particular organisational arrangements and approaches, skill and experience in proceeding shape
and define the distinctive competence of individual firms.
7
As can be formally demonstrated, the design of suitable organisational arrangements tends to be even
more computationally complex than finding an optimal solution to the problem itself (Marengo et al,
1999).  To the extent that this is a correct representation of real world decision making, this implies
that it is not sensible to assume that problem-solvers operate within ex-ante established
organisational structures, governance arrangements and PSB routines.  Indeed, organisational form
has to be established as part of, and alongside, the problem-solving activity.  Within this co-evolution
of PSBs and organisational arrangements, individuals, groups and entire firms are far from having
perfect knowledge or foresight, but ‘bounded rationality’, broadly defined, is the rule (Simon, 1981;
Dosi and Egidi, 1991; Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo, 1996).
8
To resolve highly complex dynamic problems, boundedly rational individuals and groups within
firms (as with the firm itself) are highly likely to adopt problem decomposition procedures, (for a
thorough illustration, cf. among others, the example of aeronautical engineering in Vincenti, 1990).
Here and throughout this work, largely in tune with Herbert Simon's perspective on problem-solving,
by "decomposition" we mean the identification of ensembles of tasks or "sub-problems" whose
solution is meant to yield also to the solution of the overall problem. So, for example, if the general
problem is the development and construction of an airplane with certain technical characteristics,
"decompositions" might involve the identification of "sub-problems" concerning e.g. engine thrust,
wing loads, aerodynamic shapes of the body, etc.
Over time, decomposition heuristics and routines are likely to evolve differently in different firms as
they learn to reduce the dimensions of search space through experience.  As a result, not all
decomposition strategies are necessarily successful (or equally successful), and no selection
mechanism or process of choice (e.g. incentives) necessarily exists to ensure an optimum solution to
product, process or organisational problems.
Consequently it is reasonable to assume that the problem-solving abilities of firms are nested within
an ‘ubiquitous sub-optimality’.  Rather, intra-firm learning patterns and inter-organisational selection
                                               
7 With roots in the earlier contributions of Penrose (1958), Chandler (1962) and Richardson (1972), a
growing literature is exploring the nature of organisations in terms of “competencies” and “capabilities”:
see, among others, Teece, Pisano and Schuen (1994), Teece et al. (1994), Barney (1991) and the
contributions in Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000).
8 Problem-solvers in firms most likely include engineers, designers or project managers, but also, in different
ways, most other employees.  This applies in particular to CoPS projects, wherein each worker or
‘practitioner’ (e.g. a software writer or draftsperson) is an ‘intelligent agent’ responsible for managing his or
her task and interfacing with other individuals and groups working on different aspects of the same product
or problem (Hobday and Brady, 1998).6
processes need first to be considered as evolutionary processes, even neglecting, in a first
approximation, the diverse incentive-driven behaviours which different organisational forms elicit.
9
These propositions are naturally consistent with an emerging evolutionary approach to ‘what
business firms are and do’ (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1982 and 1988; Dosi, 1988, Teece
et al, 1994, Dosi and Marengo 1994 and Marengo, 1996) and are largely overlapping and
complementary with the view expressed by Simon (1991), March and Simon (1958) and Radner
(1992) among others.
In this approach, the product in question clearly matters (e.g. steel, computers or polypropylene) as
does the great diversity in processes and organisational arrangements deployed to make a particular
product.  No single individual knows the entire production plan and, within both the management of
business-as-usual and in the search for new product designs and efficient processes, organisations
display an ensemble of routine procedures, through which organisations often manage to co-ordinate
their tasks well enough to deliver a coherent set of processes and products.  In contrast to the
‘optimal machine’ analogy, the firm can be viewed as an intelligent but fallible “organism” trying to
adapt imperfectly and path-dependently to a changing environment shaped also by other organisms
(including competitors, suppliers and buyers).
In the evolutionary view, the basic units of analysis for PSBs are, on the one hand, elementary
physical acts (such as moving a drawing from one office to another) and elementary cognitive acts
(such as a simple calculation) on the other.  Problem-solving can then be defined as a combination of
elementary acts within a procedure, leading eventually to a feasible outcome (e.g. an aircraft engine
or a chemical compound).  Or, seen the other way round, given the possibly infinite set of procedures
leading to a given outcome or product, it is possible to decompose these procedures into diverse
series of elementary cognitive and physical acts of varying lengths which may be executed according
to various possible execution architectures (e.g. sequential, parallel or hierarchical).
PBSs straightforwardly link with the notion of organisational competencies and capabilities. First, a
firm displays the operational competencies associated with its actual problem-solving procedures (in
line with the routines discussed by Nelson and Winter, 1982 and Cohen et al., 1996).  Second, the
formal and informal organisational structure of the firm determines the way in which cognitive and
physical acts are distributed and the decomposition rules which govern what is and what is not
admissible within a particular firm (providing a route into the analysis of incentive structures and
processes). Third, the organisation shapes the search heuristics for, as yet, unresolved problems,
thereby governing creative processes within the firm.
This theoretical approach to PSB within the firm also corresponds closely to empirical accounts of
firm behaviour from the economics of innovation (Freeman, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Pavitt, 1999).
Moreover, it has the benefit of being applicable both to the analysis of intra-firm structures and to the
analysis of the boundaries between firms and the market.  Indeed, such boundaries can be seen as
particular patterns of decomposition of an overall problem-solving task.  In other words, the
boundary of the firm is shaped, in part, by the problem to be solved, often corresponding to the
product to be created (e.g. a car or a piece of steel).  Particular decomposition strategies will range
from the totally centralised and autarkic types (with no decomposition at all) to the equivalent of a
                                               
9  A comprehensive account of economic behaviour of firms should, of course, account for incentives as well
as the co-evolution of PSBs and governance arrangements, as argued by Coriat and Dosi (1998) and Dosi
and Marengo (1994).  However, a second point of departure is given by the understanding of the diverse
PSBs of firms, and then proceeding to assess the ways in which incentive structures co-evolve with PSBs.7
pure market, where one person acts on each task with market-like transactions linking each
elementary act.
From an empirical perspective, it then becomes important to ask whether and under which
circumstances ‘markets’ (i.e. complete decentralised distributions of knowledge) have problem-
solving advantages over more centralised, ‘hierarchical’ forms of decomposition.  The next section
presents some simple conceptual building blocks for analysing this type of question.
3.  Products, tasks and organisations as problems of design
It is helpful to think of complex problem-solving activities as problems of design: the design of
elaborate artefacts and the design of the processes and organisational structures required to produce
them.  In turn, these processes require the design of complex sequences of moves, rules, behaviours
and search heuristics involving one or many different actors to solve problems, create new
"representations" of problems themselves and ultimately to achieve the techno-economic goals at
hand.  Common to all these design activities is that they involve search in large combinatorial spaces
of ‘components’ (as defined above in terms of elementary physical and cognitive acts) which have to
be closely co-ordinated.  To complicate matters still further, the functional relations among these
elements are only partly understood and can only be locally explored through a process of trial-and-
error learning, often involving also the application of expert, partly tacit knowledge.
For example, the design of a complex artefact such as an aircraft or a flight simulator requires the
co-ordination of many different design elements, including engine type and power, wing size and
shape and other materials.  The interaction between each of the sub-systems and components is only
partly understood and each comprises many smaller components and sub-systems (Miller et. al,
1995; Prencipe, 1997).  The interactions between the elements of the system can only be partly
expressed by general models and have to be tested through simulation, prototype building, and trial-
and-error moves where learning and tacit knowledge play an important part.  Producing an effective
solution, such as a new aircraft, involves a long sequence of moves, each of which is chosen out of an
enormous set of possibilities.  In turn, the relations among the moves in the sequence can only be
partly known as a full understanding would (impossibly) require the knowledge of the entire set of
possibilities.  The likelihood of combinatorial explosion within the search space presents a
computationally intractable task for boundedly rational agents.  As Metcalfe and de Liso (1995)
argue, the beliefs and routines of the firm act as a focusing device, indicating where to search in order
to produce functioning artefacts:  “Paradoxical though it may seem, to make progress it is necessary
to limit progress” (p. 21).  In that, also the "culture" of the firm acts as an interpretative system
grounded in the community of practice of the firm, which allows progress and learning under
conditions of extreme uncertainty and vast opportunities for design choice.
Business firms as well as collaborative ventures among them can therefore be seen as complex,
multi-dimensional bundles of routines, decision rules, procedures and incentive schemes, whose
interplay is often largely unknown both to the managers of the organisation and also to managers,
designers and engineers responsible for single projects.  Of course, over time many repeated technical
and business activities become routinised and codified, allowing for stable, formal structures and
established codified routines as, for example, in the volume production activities of automobiles or
commodity chemicals. In these circumstances, some sort of "steady state" problem decomposition
becomes institutionalised, also allowing the establishment of neat organisational structures, and,
together, the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. The "Fordist" and "Chandlerian"8
archetypes of organisation are the classic example. This is also the organisational arrangement which
most forcefully highlights potential advantages (and also the in-built rigidities) of division of labour
and specialisation.  However, even in this stable case there remain many non–routine, complex
activities within the firm, including new product design, research and development, new marketing
programmes, and so on.  In these areas the foregoing properties of search for new PSBs continue to
apply and organisational forms take a variety of shapes in relation to these tasks.  In addition, under
conditions of rapid market and technological change even stable ("Fordist") organisations are often
forced to re-assess and re-constitute their structures in order to respond to new market demands and
to exploit new technical opportunities (see, for example, the related discussions by Coriat and by
Fujimoto in Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) on Japanese – “Toyotist” – organisational arrangements
and routines.
During the multi-stage product design task, the basic elements to be co-ordinated are characterised by
strong inter-dependencies which create many local optima within the search space.  For instance,
adding a more powerful engine could lead to a reduction in the performance of an aircraft or prevent
it from flying altogether if the other sub-systems and components are not simultaneously adapted.
Similarly, at the organisational level, the introduction of new routines, practices or incentive schemes
which have proven superiority in another context, could also prove counter-productive if other
elements of the organisation are not appropriately adapted to suit the new inputs (Dosi, Nelson and
Winter, 2000).
A helpful ‘reduced form’ metaphor of the complex task problem is presented in Kauffman’s (1993)
model of selection dynamics in the biological domain with heterogeneous interdependent traits.
Kauffman considers a model of the selection mechanisms whereby the units of selection are complex
entities made of several non-linearly interacting components. Units of selection are combinations of N
elementary components (genes or morphological or behavioural traits) which can assume one of an
finite number of states and a fitness value is exogeneously assigned to each “gene” producing a
fitness landscape on the space of combinations, reflecting the interdependencies among the
constituent elements.  His model shows that as the number of interdependent elements increases the
fitness landscape presents an exponentially increasing number of local optima.  In the presence of
strong interdependencies (as occurs in many complex products, see Part 3) the system cannot be
optimised by separately optimising each element it is made of.  Indeed, in the case of strong
interdependencies it might well be the case that some, or even all, solutions obtained by tuning "in the
right direction" each component yield a worse performance than the current one.
In the presence of strong interdependencies the problem cannot therefore be decomposed into separate
sub-problems which could be optimised separately from the others (Marengo, 1999). However, as
argued by Simon (1981) problem-solving by boundedly rational agents must necessarily proceed by
decomposing a large, complex and intractable problem into smaller sub-problems which can be
solved independently.  Within the firm this is equivalent to a division of problem-solving labour.
However, the extent of the division of problem-solving labour is limited by the existence of
interdependencies.  If, in the process of sub-problem decomposition, interdependent elements are
separated then solving each sub-problem interdependently does not allow overall optimisation.  As
Simon (1981) also points out, since a perfect de-composition, which isolates in separate sub-
problems all and only the elements which are interdependent to each other, can only be designed by
someone who has perfect knowledge of the problem, boundedly rational agents will normally try to
design ‘near-decompositions’.  The latter are decompositions which try to isolate the most
performance relevant interdependencies into separate sub-problems.
Unlike the biological analogy above, the design space of a problem faced by an engineer or a firm is
not given exogenously but, rather, is constructed by them as a subjective representation of the
problem itself where, in practice, much of the search takes place.  If the division of problem-solving9
labour is limited by interdependencies, the structure of the latter, in turn, depends on how the problem
is framed by the problem-solvers.  Sometimes with major innovations, problem solvers are able to
make major leaps forward by re-framing the problem itself in a novel way.  For example, in the
accounts of wireless communications development provided by Levinthal (1998) and the Polaris
missile system by Sapolsky (1972) various known system elements were combined and re-combined
in creative new ways.
In short, the representation of the problem itself plays a crucial part in determining its complexity.
By acting on its representation, decision-makers can make a problem more or less decomposable.
The division of problem-solving labour is therefore very much a question of how the problem is
represented and its elements encoded.
Given the limits that interdependencies pose to the division of problem-solving labour, an important
part of the representation is how agents evaluate the "goodness" of solutions.  As already mentioned,
the problem of interdependencies amount to a problem of mis-alignement of local vs. global
performance signals: local moves in the ‘right direction’ may well decrease overall performance if
particular elements are not properly adjusted to the moves.  Thus there is room for the design of
many alternative methods of performance assessment.  In the formal model presented elsewhere
(Marengo et al, 1999), for every problem of a given class there can be different performance
assessment schemes, providing a set of payoffs to variations of components of the solution which
allow for maximum decomposition.  This form of performance assessment makes local adaptation
and decentralised trial-and-error search effective as strategies.
During the design of PSBs and in the long-term building of the distinctive competence of firms, the
architecture of the firm co-evolves with its decomposition schemes.  Indeed, any organisational
hierarchy may be seen, from a problem-solving perspective, as entailing particular decompositions
into blocks of elements (sub-problems and organisationally admissible behaviours and tasks assigned
to them) which, together make the overall configuration of the PSBs and organisational governance
of the firm.  In complex tasks, firms continue to go through step-by-step experiments with groups of
elements in order to improve the performance of the overall system.  In some cases, activities are
more or less decomposable (e.g. finance and manufacturing, or a mechanical and electrical system).
Here the firm is able to rapidly find a an appropriate “robust” decomposition.
However, in many cases (e.g. product design and systems integration) notwithstanding the ubiquitous
search for "modularity", tasks are highly interdependent, leading to indeterminacy in PSBs and
governance arrangements and many different solutions to chose from.  When building a
decomposition scheme, firms might ideally search for perfect decomposability, so that all groups of
elements can be optimised in a totally independent way from the others.  However, near-
decomposability is more common as many problems cannot be divided into neatly isolated groups of
components which can all be solved independently.
Problem-solving design does not only involve search within a given space but also, and very
importantly, a re-framing of the problem itself by the agents within the firm.  Changing the frame or
representation of the particular problem is a powerful form of PSB.   Indeed, as argued in Marengo
(1996), the establishment of collectively shared representations and problem-solving frames is one of
the fundamental roles of top management. Equally important, when the organisational architecture
allows it, groups within the firm, by experimentation, are able to collectively evolve new
representations, possibly yielding more effective decompositions.  In the formal model presented by
Marengo et al (1999) the construction of shared representations allows for the simplification of
complex problems, offering a more powerful strategy than attempting to optimise any particular
given representation.  Experience and learning provide the agents with knowledge of probable viable
decompositions as well as probably ‘well-behaved representations’.10
In the real world of decision-making, agents rarely hold a full representation of the overall problem
and can only control a limited number of elements involved.  Firms have to proceed by roughly
defining an architecture for various blocks of elements to be integrated (e.g. electronic hardware and
software systems), assigning the blocks to individuals and groups, co-ordinated by a project manager
or equivalent.  This way they try to achieve decomposability and, where not possible, effective
communications and interactions between agents across the various blocks of sub-tasks. Note that
top-down assignments of sub-problems and formal tasks rarely match perfectly the actual
decompositions achieved via “horizontal” self-organising adjustments (for a fascinating longitudinal
story of these dynamics throughout the establishment of a major telecom company see Narduzzo,
Rocco and Warlglien (2000)). Indeed, the mismatches between “formal” representations and
decompositions and actual (emergent) ones, are at the same time a major drawback on organisational
performances but also a potential source of organisational learning. These processes are endemic to
most activities involved in the production of CoPS, as discussed in the following sections.
4.  PSBs in complex products and systems
Complex product systems (CoPS) are high value artefacts, systems, sub-systems, software packages,
control units, networks and high technology constructs.
10  As high technology customised capital
goods, they tend to be made in one-off projects or small-batches.  The emphasis of production is on
design, project management, systems engineering and systems integration.  Examples include
telecommunications exchanges, flight simulators, aircraft engines, avionics systems, train engines, air
traffic control units, systems for electricity grids, offshore oil equipment, baggage handling systems,
R&D equipment, bio-informatics systems, intelligent buildings and cellular phone network
equipment.
There are many different categories of CoPS, ranging from relatively traditional goods (e.g. train
engines) to new IT networks (e.g. internet super-servers) to established goods which have been
radically transformed by IT (e.g. integrated mail processing systems and printing press machinery).
They can be categorised according to sector (e.g. aerospace, military and transportation), function
(e.g. control systems, communications and R&D), and degree of complexity (e.g. as measured by the
number of tailored components and sub-systems, design options and amount of new knowledge
required).
The physical composition and production processes of most CoPS have changed due to the diffusion
of IT and embedded software.  As software becomes a core technology, many CoPS are becoming
more complex and difficult to produce partly as a result of the human, craft design element involved
in software development.
11  Technical progress, combined with new industrial demands have greatly
enhanced the functional scope, performance and complexity of CoPS throughout, from jet engines to
nuclear power simulation systems.
                                               
10  This section draws from Hobday (1998).  The term CoPS is used, as ‘capital goods’ fails to capture the
diversity and range of systems involved.  CoPS are, in fact, a subset of capital goods (and might eventually
include sophisticated consumer goods). Somewhat similar issues, related to the variety and complexity of
knowledge emerge in connection with products which are relatively simple as such but require complex
search procedures to be discovered. Pharmaceutical are an archetypical example: cf. Orsenigo, Pammolli and
Riccaboni (1999).
11  The effect of software can be interpreted as shifting the emphasis of production from a relatively
predictable ‘engineering’ task to a much more imprecise design-intensive ‘development’ process, increasing
the degree of uncertainty and learning involved in the production of each system.11
CoPS have at least three defining characteristics which distinguish them from mass produced goods.
First, as high cost, capital goods they consist of many interconnected, often customised elements
(including control units, sub-systems and components), usually organised in a hierarchical manner
and tailored for specific customers and/or markets.  Often their sub-systems (e.g. the avionics
systems for aircraft) are themselves complex, customised and high cost.  Second, they tend to exhibit
emergent properties during production, as unpredictable and unexpected events occur during design
and systems engineering and integration (Boardman, 1990; Shenhar, 1994).  Emerging properties
also occur from generation to generation, as small changes in one part of a system's design often call
for large alterations in other parts, requiring the addition of more sophisticated control systems and,
sometimes, new materials (e.g. in jet engines).  Third, because they are high value capital goods,
CoPS tend to be produced in projects or in small batches which allow for a high degree of direct user
involvement, enabling business users to engage directly into the innovation process, rather than
through arms-length market transactions, as normally the case in commodity goods.
There are many different dimensions of product complexity, each of which can confer task
complexity and non-routine behaviour to production and innovation tasks.  These dimensions include
the numbers of components, the degree of customisation of both system and components, multiple
design choices, elaborate systems architectures, breadth and depth of knowledge and skill required,
and the variety of materials and information inputs.  Users frequently change their requirements
during production, leading to unclear goals, uncertainty in production and unpredictable,
unquantifiable risks.  Managers and engineers often have to proceed from one production stage to the
next with incomplete information, relying on inputs from other suppliers who may be competitors in
other multi-firm projects.  Project management often involves negotiating between the competing
interests, goals and cultures of the various organisations involved in production.
Many CoPS are produced within projects which incorporate prime contractors, systems integrators,
users, buyers, other suppliers, small and medium sized enterprises and sometimes government
agencies and regulators.  Often, these agents collaborate together, taking innovation (e.g. new design)
decisions in advance of and during production, as in the case of flight simulators (Miller et al, 1995).
Projects consist of temporary multi-firm alliances where systems integration and project management
competencies are critical to production.  The project represents a sort of focusing device which
enables the problems of design and production to be addressed.  It is also responsible for realising the
market, co-ordinating decisions across firms, enabling buyer involvement and matching technical and
financial resources through time.  Because production is oriented to meet the needs of large business
users, the project management task is fundamentally different from the mass production task.  As
Joan Woodward (1958, p23) already put it in her research into UK project-based companies in the
1950s:
“those responsible for marketing had to sell, not a product, but the idea that their firm was able to
produce what the customer required.  The product was developed after the order had been secured,
the design being, in many cases, modified to suit the requirements of the customer.  In mass
production firms, the sequence is quite different: product development came first, then production,
and finally marketing”.
5.  Designing organisational forms for CoPS
Although vast and diverse bodies of literature exist on organisational forms, there are not many
studies which examine in any depth the project-based organisation or forms suited to CoPS.
12
                                               
12 Works germane to our analysis include Gann and Salter (1998) who provide a rare account of how project
processes relate to wider organizational activities within a project-based organization, and Middleton (1967)12
Certainly, the relation between organisational form and the problem solving nature of the firm is at
the heart of "competence-based" and, largely overlapping, evolutionary perspectives (e.g. Dosi,
Nelson and Winter, 2000, Dosi and Marengo, 1994, Kogut and Zander, 1992 and 1996, Nelson and
Winter, 1982, Nelson, 1991, Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1994, Teece et al., 1994, Conner and
Prahalad, 1996, Leonard-Barton, 1995, Winter, 1988). The competence view in fact focuses on
organisations as repositories of problem-solving knowledge and analyses some salient properties of
knowledge accumulation and the ways the latter co-evolve with organisational structures and
practices (including, of course, routines but also managerial heuristics and strategies).
Organisational specificities and persistently different revealed performances, are thus interpreted also
on the grounds of path-dependence in knowledge accumulation and inertial persistence of
organisational traits. Bounded rationality, in its broadest meaning, is the norm. Its general sources
include the "complexity" and procedural uncertainty associated with problem-solving procedures and
the intrinsic "opaqueness" of the relationship between actions and environmental feed-backs, so that it
is seldom obvious, even ex-post, to state how well one did and why (March, 1994).
Taking all that as a (quite sound, in our view) point of departure, one must acknowledge, however,
that one is still far from having comprehensive taxonomies mapping discrete organizational types into
diverse forms of knowledge distributions and problem-solving behaviours, even if one find suggestive
exercises in this  direction.
So, for example, Mintzberg (1979), partly building on the work of Burns and Stalker (1961) attempts
to derive a classification contingent on the nature of markets, tasks and technologies (A somewhat
extreme notion of "contingency" of organizational forms upon environmental characteristics is, of
course, in Lawrence and Lorsch (1971).
He describes five basic organisational forms: (a) the “machine bureaucracy” with highly centralised
control systems, suited to a stable environment; (b) the divisional form suited to mass production
efficiency; (c) the professional bureaucracy made up of flat organisational structures, useful for
delegating complex, professional tasks (e.g. in universities); (d) the simple or entrepreneurial
structure, valuable for its informality and flexibility; and (e) the ‘adhocracy’, which is a temporary
project-based design, suited to complex tasks and turbulent and uncertain markets.  Somewhat
similarly largely building upon a competence-based view of organizations, Teece (1996) proposes six
categories of firm: (1) stand-alone entrepreneur inventor; (2) multiproduct integrated hierarchy; (3)
high flex, Silicon Valley type; (4) "virtual" corporation; (5) conglomerate; and (6) alliance
enterprise.
13
Other observers of organisation form (e.g. Galbraith 1971, 1973; Larson and Gobeli 1987, 1989)
describe a range of alternatives from pure functional form through to pure "product form", where
management structures are centred upon each product.
A general conjecture lurking through many such taxonomic efforts is the positive relation between
some form of organizational flexibility, on the one hand, and complexity and variability of tasks, on
the other. In that vein, Burns and Stalker (1961) make the famous distinction between "organic" and
"mechanistic" organizational types. They argue that the latter is more suited to stable environments
                                                                                                                                              
on the establishment of projects within functionally-based organizations. See also Miller et al. (1995).
Research on new product development and project success factors also illustrates the importance of the
project form (Clark and Wheelwright 1992; Pinto and Prescott, 1988; Shenhar, 1993)
13  On this see also Miles and Snow (1986), whose formulation of network brokers and partners is similar
to Teece’s virtual firm and alliance enterprise respectively.13
and routine PSB, taking advantage of e.g. clearly defined job description, stable operational
boundaries and tayloristic work methods. Conversely, they suggest, under rapidly changing
technological and market conditions, open and flexibile ("organic") styles of organization make for
easier coordination between different organizational functions - such as R&D and marketing, etc.
The spirit of most of the foregoing studies tend to be either prescriptive (i.e. focused on how to
design suitable organizations) or cross-sectionally descriptive (comparing different sectors,
technologies, etc.). That makes an interesting contrast with long-term historical studies, in primis the
path-breaking investigations by Chandler (1962), hightlighting a secular trend form the rather simple
owner/manager firms of the eighteenth century, all the way to the 20
th century divisionalized/matrix
form. This is not to say that the two views are necessarily at odds with each other. For example, it
could well be that profound inter-sectoral variations (nested into different problem-soling tasks, as
mentioned) happened to go together with an overall average increase in organizational complexity
14.
We cannot tackle the issue here. Let us just mention that diverse “cross-sectional and “historical”
patterns are all nested into diverse forms of division of cognitive and manual labour which in turn is
reflected in diverse PSB and learning patterns.
In the perspective of the interpretation outlined above in this work, diverse organizational forms map
into diverse
(i)  problem representations;
(ii)  problem decompositions;
(iii)  task assignments;
(iv)  heuristics for and boundaries to exploration and learning;
(v)  mechanisms for conflicts resolution over interests, and, equally important, over alternative
cognitive frames and problem interpretations.
With respect to these dimensions, to repeat a telegraphic caricature we are rather fond of, one might
think, at one extreme, of an archetype involving complete, hierarchical, ex ante representations,
precise task assignments according to well defined functions/tasks, quite tight boundaries to
exploration - "learning" being itself a specialized function - and, if all that works, no need for ex-post
conflict resolution.
The opposite extreme archetype might be somewhat akin university departments, with a number of
representations at least as high as the number of department members, fuzzy decompositions, little
task assignments and loose boundaries to exploration, fuzzy conflict resolution rules, etc.
Clearly, Taylorist/Fordist organizational forms tend to be nearer the former archetype, which to
repeat have never been experienced by COPs, for all the reasons mentioned above. However, they do
display a quite large variety of arrangements, and with that equally diverse PSB.
                                               
14 And some scholars further speculate that the future "archetypical" firm might be somewhat different from
the classic "M-form": cf. among others, Miles et al. (1997) on the prediction of "cell-based" organizational
structures.14
Figure 1:  Positioning the Project-based Organisation
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*  F1 - F5   =  various functional departments of the organisation (eg Marketing, Finance, Human
Resources, Engineering, Manufacturing, R&D)
 
*  P1 - P5   =  major projects within the organisation (eg CoPS projects)
 
*  SM      =  senior management
 
 
Note: The number of functions and projects will vary according to the organisation in question.  Various
permutations are used here for illustration.15
Figure 1 provides a description of six ideal-type organisational forms ranging from the pure
functional form (Type A) to pure product/project form (Type F).
15  The various functional
departments of the organisation (e.g. marketing, finance, human resources, engineering, R&D, and
manufacturing) are represented by F1 to F5, while notional CoPS projects are represented by P1 to
P5.   Type B is a functionally-oriented matrix, with weak project co-ordination.  Type C is a
balanced matrix with stronger project management authority.  Type D is a project matrix, where
project managers are of equal status to functional managers.  Type E, is a ‘project-led organisation’,
in which the needs of projects outweigh the functional influence on decision-making and
representation to senior management, but weak co-ordination across project lines occurs.  Finally,
Type F is the pure project-based form where there is no formal functional co-ordination across
project lines and the entire organisation is dedicated to one or more CoPS projects.
The positioning diagram helps to contrast many of the various forms of organisation available for
dealing with complex tasks, accepting that a mixed organisational structure is possible even within a
single business unit.  Forms A to C tend to be unsuitable for CoPS, because they are inappropriate
for performing non-routine, complex project tasks in an uncertain and changing environment.  CoPS
projects typically require ‘super-heavyweight’ professional project managers (or directors), capable
of integrating both commercial and technical business functions within the project and building
strong lines of external communication both with the client (often the source of the innovation idea)
and other collaborating companies.  The collaborators may well have different goals, structures and
cultures and the task of the project director is to skilfully negotiate a path towards successful
completion.
The pure project form (F) appears to be well suited for large innovative projects and single project
firms, where resources have to be combined and shared with other firms in the project (i.e. a large
multi-firm project such as the Channel Tunnel).  The project-form is suitable for responding to
uncertainty and changing client requirements, coping with emerging properties and learning in real
time.  By contrast, the project form is weak where the functional and matrix structures are strong: in
co-ordinating resources and capabilities across projects, in executing routine production and
engineering tasks and achieving economies of scale for mass markets.
To illustrate the problem–solving advantages of the project-based form for CoPS, Figure 2 contrasts
the project management task within a functional matrix (Type B) with that of a pure project form
(Type F).  Figure 2A shows the position of the ‘weak’ project manager within the functional matrix,
involving multiple lines of communication, control and command, and the sub-ordination to various
department managers.  Here project co-ordination embodies a linear or sequential model of project
management, in which the project passes through various stages and departments in turn.  Client and
suppliers are external to the project and the project manager has to perform a highly complex internal
task of balancing various internal interests and meeting different demands (e.g. in terms of reporting
and quality control) of the departments.  There are many lines of communication with project team
members (TM 1 to TM 6) who also report to functional or departmental managers (FM 1 to FM 6)
to whom they owe their career allegiance.
Throughout the problem-solving process, project managers in the functional and matrix forms also
face many difficulties in external co-ordination.  To reply to customer requests they often have gain
information and commitments from engineering, purchasing and planning departments.  The larger
and more complex the project, the more difficult the task of keeping the client informed and
responding to requests for changes.
                                               
15 This section draws heavily on Hobday (2000).16
Figure 2: Comparing the Project Management Function in functional and project-
based organisations
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*  FM   =  Function Manager
*  TM   =  Team Manager
*  PM   =  Project Manager
*  TMF =  Team member/function
*  S       =  Supplier17
By contrast, Figure 2B shows the position of the project mangers in a project-based organisation in
relation to the specialist functions within the project.  The project manger is the main channel of
communication and can exercise control to co-ordinate and integrate specialist functions, focusing on
the needs of each project.  Because there are few internal lines of command and communication to
interfere with project objectives, the internal co-ordination task becomes simpler and the ability to
react to emerging properties is enhanced.
Similarly on the external front, clear strong lines of command and communications can be built up
with the client (Figure 2C).  In principle, the project manager is able to quickly assess and react to
changes in client needs and learn from feedback from the client and major component suppliers (S 1
to S 5).  The project manager has both the responsibility and power to react to unexpected events,
negotiate changes with the client and, if necessary, put suppliers of sub-systems together with the
customer to resolve difficult problems.
The project-based organisation embodies a concurrent model of project management in which tasks
are integrated as required by the project.  In principle, the project-based form boasts several
advantages over the functional and matrix forms for CoPS.  Producing a CoPS is often a creative
task, requiring innovation at both the product and organisational levels.  Production typically
involves many knowledge-intensive, non-routine tasks and decision-taking under conditions of
uncertainty.  These uncertain processes cannot easily be codified within routine procedures as
learning during production is required to complete the task.  Because the project-based form is able to
create and re-create organisational structures and processes around the needs of each product (and
customer) it contrasts sharply with the anti-innovation bias which are likely to be displayed by large
functional organisations with their semi-permanent departments and rigid processes.  The challenge
of managing CoPS is one of ensuring responsiveness to the changing needs of customers, and dealing
with the emerging properties which arise in production.  It is also a challenge of anticipating future
client needs and convincing buyers of the firm’s competence to deliver new systems in the future.  On
the other hand, the looser the structure is the more difficult it is also to codify past learning
achievements into some organizational memory; together, mobility employees might have a greater
impact on organizational capabilities and performances. There are indeed subtle trade-offs in all the
foregoing organizational arrangements – and together unexploited learning opportunities – of which
most often the actors involved are only partly aware.
Symmetrically, “diagnostic” techniques and heuristics for organizational design might be surprisingly
effective in the improvement of decision-making processes and PSB.
6.  Heuristics for organisational design and collective action in complex task environments
In this respect, let us briefly report on how the foregoing framework on problem-solving can be
combined with work from organisation development field to produce a method to assist in the real
world of problem-solving, at least in the case of the design and the production of complex products
and systems. We have been discussing above, from a theoretical point of view, the crucial step of
decomposition of complex problems into nearly independent sub-problems and the difficulties
thereupon. Indeed, a first operational task in a practical, diagnostic, exercise is to help identify
alternative representations and, relatedly, decompositions of the problem at hand. Second, the
exercise ought to be aimed to elicit the differences between formal vs. informal processes (and
structures) for each project. Third, and relatedly, it provided mechanisms for a sort of endogenous
benchmarking. This technique avoids the need for conventional benchmarking which, in any case,
cannot be applied to one-off, non-routine tasks, but rather tries to elicit the very representation of
such a benchmark and feeds back this data to the 'actors' in a structured manner in order to help them
design and develop the complex product and ensure an appropriate organisational structure.  The
outcome tends to be a re-combination of tasks and structures in the companies in which the18
intervention was made and, in general, a reduction of the difficulties inherent in complex one-off
tasks, through a narrowing of the gap between formal and actual practices and processes.
To operationalise the theory, an experimental attempt was made to develop and apply an action
research technique to collective decision-making in six large multi-project CoPS suppliers in
Europe.
16  The approach is partly based on intervention techniques developed within the field of
organisation development (a sub-field of organisational behaviour), which spans both management
strategy and implementation (Schein, 1990; Mullins, 1994; Handy, 1993; French and Bell, 1973;
Tyson and Jackson, 1992), and tends to treat strategy, management, learning and innovation as
iterative processes rooted in working practices, which are 'crafted', informal and sensitive to
organisational forms (Mintzberg, 1989; Seeley Brown and Duguid, 1996).  Using research data,
selective outside interventions can sometimes be helpful in surfacing issues, identifying problems and
stimulating new working practices (French and Bell, 1973).
The method was initially developed for the analysis and improvement of PSBs in complex software
projects in collaboration with process analysts in a large French corporation.  The purpose of the
method (or ‘tool’) is to assist collective decision-making in order to arrive at effective PSBs and
appropriate organisational forms for projects and specific tasks within projects (e.g. design, bidding
and sub-contractor management), in the common situation where each product and project is different
and processes are, to a large extent, uncodifiable.
17  The method involves generating benchmark data
on behaviours, routines and structures and feeding this back to company teams in real time in order
to assist problem-solving under conditions of bounded rationality and task complexity, by promoting
more effective collective action by ‘shining a mirror’ on the organisation.
A distinctive feature of the method is that it focuses on the tacit, informal side of the PSB and
informal organisations, comparing these systematically with formal processes and organisational
structures.  In other words it compares ‘what should be and what should happen’ with real, actual
practices (‘what actually happens’), in order to identify variance (for explanation and discussion)
problems, their causes and strategies for improvement.  The tool complements other formal
procedures which exist in most large firms by delivering a ‘bottom up’ practitioner view of real
processes in action.
The method is applied by decomposing the CoPS project roughly into tasks, which include not only
the main technical activities, but other functions such as finance, manufacturing and scheduling.  To
carry out a minimalist intervention in a large firm, typically two projects are identified, to allow for
comparability and contrast.  Within (and above) the projects, twelve or so individuals at three or four
levels of seniority are selected across the project tasks.  The researchers then carry out the
intervention with the members of the ‘slice group’ for each project, according to the five standard
steps in Figure 3), each with more detailed sub-processes and outputs (Hobday and Brady, 1998).
Step 1 involves agreeing with management and practitioners the scope, aims, outputs and timing of
the exercise, and identifying the slice group of interviewees (this focuses especially on practitioners
                                               
16 This work is carried out by one of us (M. H.)within the CoPS Innovation Centre at SPRU. Hobday and
Brady, (1997; 2000) provide full details of the method, one in-depth case study, and the results of the six
applications mentioned briefly below.
17 In such cases, firms cannot apply normal benchmarking or improvement techniques (e.g. total quality
management, continuous improvement, statistical process control or business process re-engineering) as
these presume routine codifiable procedures, determinate tasks and established forms (usually departments),
rather than temporary project forms.19
who understand best the informal project processes).  In step 2 data is collected on formal codified
practices as usually contained in toolkits, manuals, flow charts, formal procedures (and a few
interviews with senior managers), on how the process ‘should’ proceed.  If the firm does not have
formal codified procedures for the project, then senior management views or any ‘best practice’
model of project management can be used.
18  Using a standard questionnaire, qualitative data is
gathered from practitioners on how processes actually proceed in the two projects and in the wider
organisation (inputs, activities and outputs are described and informal flow charts are drawn).  Step 3
involves comparing the formal (‘should be’) practices with informal, uncodified activities to generate
key differences (e.g. by comparing formal and informal flow charts).  This represents a rapid form of
real-time benchmarking (comparing actual with codified practices) for complex tasks.
19
Variances tend to fall into two categories: major problem areas and best practices (or solutions to
problems).  Often solutions consist of engineers resolving problems caused by the formal processes!
In step 4 the findings are presented back to practitioners for verification, which involves feedback on
the accuracy of the data collected, omissions, the extent and depth of problems identified and the
nature of the solutions.  At this stage, quantitative data can be gathered if needed (using Likert scales,
for example, on the extent of particular problems in the organisation).  Step 4 also includes an
analysis of the causes of problems, a discussion of possible solutions and proposals for
implementation, as applied both to project processes (including PSBs) and organisational structures.
Step 5 involves reporting back to senior management (who have agreed to act on the findings) and the
agreement of a plan for improvement.  The actual format depends on the culture of the company.  In
some, the practitioners are happy to have senior managers involved closely in all steps.  In others
practitioners are inhibited in the presence of functional and project mangers.
Figure 3:  Process Analysis and Improvement Method: Five Basic Steps
￿ set up programme; identify structured group for interviews and workshops
￿ data collection: codified processes (management) vs actual informal processes (practitioners)
￿ benchmark analysis: identify key variances (a) problem areas (b) best practices - prepare 
workshop 1
￿ workshop 1: (a) verification (b) establish causes of problems (c) identify solutions  (d) 
proposals on implementation
￿ workshop 2: report back to senior management - agree actions/support for implementation
Although the method was initially developed for complex software projects, it has subsequently been
modified and applied to other domains and other non-routine, complex processes.  However, the
approach remains the same - the application of an outside intervention to benchmark codified against
actual processes in order to provide data to question, assess and sometime re-compose organisational
                                               
18  Formal procedural models are presented in many project management and software engineering texts
(including Boehm, 1988; 1989; Kellner, 1996), most of which are rationalist in that they do not recognise or
deal with informal processes, structures or emerging properties.
19  The aim is not to gather comprehensive data, but sufficient information to run the verification and
improvement workshops.20
structures and processes.  The following six examples give some idea of the scope of the intervention
technique.
Company A is a producer of complex embedded software for flight simulators.  Here, the purpose
was to improve software processes within a new change programme.  The group discussions led to
the questioning of (redundant) software tools and a reconfiguration of parts of the software process,
contributing to an upgrading of the latter according to the official international quality standard
‘CMM’.  The intervention enabled software practitioners to shape work processes by contributing
new more appropriate tools and training programmes aligned with real, rather than formal work
processes, with the consequence of reducing also variances between initial software estimates and
actual outcomes in terms of budget and costs. In the language introduced above, the objective was
achieved by the identification of a closer  alignment between formal problem decompositions/ task
assignments and actual, “informally learned”, ones.
Company B is a supplier of components for naval equipment organised along lines established lines
in the 1960s.  The task was the improvement of product development processes for a new generation
of nuclear submarine cores.  The two main technical groups involved - design engineering and
manufacturing engineering - organised separately along traditional lines, were brought together
during the intervention, enabling them to analyse, question and re-configure the ‘normal’ linear
sequence of design and production.  By introducing more concurrency into the design-build cycle, re-
work was reduced as a result of closer engineering-manufacturing integration: more “fuzzy”
decompositions, broader “spans of exploration” and faster information exchange cycles have been
key organizational modifications.
Company C is a producer of synchrotron particle accelerators and large scale magnetic equipment for
scientific research.  This intervention focused on the assessment of the relative merits of two different
organisational structures (one project-based and one functionally-based) in the company.  The data
gathered from practitioners during the interviews showed that the functionally-based structure was
largely unsuitable for large one-off projects, although it operated well for batch production and
standard product lines with little new technology.  By contrast, the project-based structure revealed a
close matching between formal and informal processes and an ability to cope with emerging
properties in design and production, by virtue of project team coherence and strong leadership.  The
data were used to design and implement a new project-based structure for all major projects as an
alternative to the functionally-based system.  Together, some functional co-ordination was also
introduced to promote learning and technical leadership along the lines of the project-led organisation
(see Figure 1).
Company D is a producer of base stations for mobile phone systems.  The intervention focused on the
installation and extension of new turnkey systems for a mobile telecommunications network.  The
work, which compared formal project management processes with what actually occurred during the
first implementation phase, captured major problems in the formal project management procedures
and revealed many differences between formal and actual practices, - some of which hindered the
project, others which helped -. The data were used by the company to develop a “best practice”
‘Turnkey Project Start-up Guide’ which formally embodied many of the informal practices and
excluded unnecessary procedures.  This was placed on the company intranet to be updated with new
experiences as learning occurred in new projects.
Company E is a large telecommunications service provider introducing a new business line of
‘integrated system and service solutions’, involving several areas of network technology new to the
company.  The intervention helped practitioners decide which new processes and routines would be
needed in bidding for new business contracts and which were only appropriate for traditional
business lines.  Eventually, this led to the setting up of, first, a consultancy wing of the company and,21
then, a New Projects Division, largely independent of the main organisation.  This re-composition of
the organisation turned out to be a valuable way of capturing and accelerating learning and rapidly
expanding the new business.
Company F is a supplier of high value equipment for monitoring and measuring large scale (rolling
mill) steel production.  The intervention, which focused on both research and the development of
prototypes for in-house use and for sale to external users, revealed that the main total quality
programme (TQP) in place was suited to routine manufacturing activities, but unsuitable for the
needs of R&D.  In this case, the intervention was a rare opportunity for R&D staff to review internal
procedures and external relations with university and sub-contractor partners.  Eventually, the TQP
was modified to recognise the uncertainties involved in R&D and the emerging properties expected in
prototype development.  Some modifications were made to the formal systems to bring them closer in
line with real practices especially where sub-contractors and universities needed to be more closely
integrated into the project teams.
To sum up, the diagnostic and benchmarking technique helped to analyse and re-combine processes
and structures for one off, non-routine activities.  In terms of scope, as the above cases indicate, the
method has been applied to various complex tasks, cutting across sectors, technologies and different
stages of the project life cycle, contributing to project processes and wider organisational structures.
The above examples cover R&D, prototype development, design, engineering, production and
installation of CoPS, as well as bid phase and new business development activities.  In describing
impacts and benefits, it is important to emphasise that the cases above represent experimental, small-
scale interventions and that much depended on management follow through and, in some cases, on the
success of the wider change programmes in which the interventions were embedded.  It is also
difficult to disentangle the effects of the interventions from the impact of other changes taking place
(for example, three companies underwent mergers and restructuring during our work).  However,
each of the firms claimed that the de-composition and questioning of processes and structures, based
on the foregoing heuristics had a significant impact on organizational learning and performances.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed and tried to make operational an evolutionary perspective for
understanding firms as imperfect, collective problem-solving entities, suggesting an interpretative
framework for the patterns by which firms deploy and match problem-solving activities with
organizational structures.  The paper applied these concepts to a broad class of high value capital
goods (or ‘complex product systems’) which are inherently complex and non-routine in nature,
conferring extreme task complexity throughout many stages of production and innovation.
The paper focuses on the processes through which problem-solving and creative knowledge co-evolve
with organisational form in complex, non-stable, non-routine and complex task environments.
Following Simon (1981), problem-solving and organisational structure are viewed as a type of design
activity, where elementary physical and cognitive acts (or ‘elements’) are tested, combined and
recombined to arrive at solutions.  Because of bounded rationality, firms de-compose problems into
manageable, but interdependent, and most likely “sub-optimal” blocks of elements.  Within the firm,
this is equivalent to a division of problem-solving labour, where the extent of the division of problem
solving labour is limited by the existence of interdependencies.  If, in the process of sub-problem
decomposition, interdependent elements are separated, then solving each block interdependently does
not allow overall optimisation.  Since perfect decompositions with perfectly independent sub-
problems rarely exist, boundedly rational agents normally try to design ‘near-decompositions’ which
try to isolate the most performance relevant interdependencies into separate sub-problems.  Problem-
solving design does not only involve search within a given space but also, and very importantly, a re-22
framing of the problem itself by agents within the firm.  By such re-framing the organization and
groups within it arrive at more powerful representations, which often (but not always) allows also
greater decentralisation and decomposability.
While the approach was applied to non-routine complex tasks and environment, the ‘spirit’ of the
model also applies to routine, decomposable tasks.  Here, however, the de-composition problem is, so
to speak, resolved ‘once-and-for-all’, as for example in the Fordist/Taylorist archetype where the
organisation is thoroughly designed and tasks are unequivocally assigned. Notice however that, even
here, many activities remain by nature non-routine and complex, including strategy formulation,
R&D, marketing and new product design and the de-composition approach to PSB and
organisational governance is likely to apply.  Furthermore, even the Fordist archetype eventually
confronts technological and market changes which force organisational and task re-composition.
The application of the approach to complex products and systems showed how the various
dimensions of product complexity can confer extreme task complexity and difficult problems of
organisational design.  For CoPS, one highly innovative form is the project-based organisation.
While traditional functional and matrix structures embody a linear or sequential model of project
management, the project form provides a concurrent model for integrating various complex technical
and marketing functions under conditions of high uncertainty, emerging properties and changing user
requirements.
To operationalise these ideas, an experimental attempt was made to facilitate collective decision-
making for the purposes of process and structure analysis and re-composition in six large multi-
project firms supplying CoPS in Europe.  The method used is partly based on intervention techniques
from the field of organisation development, which tends to treat problem-solving as iterative
processes rooted in both formal and informal working practices and structures.  The intervention
method was designed to assist firms re-frame problems using research data which compares formal,
codified processes with “real”/informal ones.  The aim was to re-compose PSBs and structures to
arrive at more appropriate organisational forms at the levels of projects and specific sub-tasks within
projects (e.g. design, engineering, production, bidding, sub-contractor management, etc.), and wider
organizational arrangements.
The apparent success of such heuristics – notwithstanding their simplicity and subject to the caveats
mentioned above – is in our view an encouraging evidence of the rich operational implications of an
evolutionary view of organizations centred on their changing problem-solving capabilities.
Adding more explicitly incentive – and power – related dimensions will certainly refine the analysis.
However, as we tried to show, disentangling the processes of knowledge generation within firms is an
activity of paramount importance in its own right – at both levels of theory and managerial practices.
And one is only at the beginning of such an enterprise.23
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